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Providing a scientific explanation of subjective experience has been elusive only because the nature of 
scientific explanation is poorly understood. One formulation of the hard problem of consciousness asks 
how it is that a bunch of chemicals squirting around in a human brain gives rise to subjective experience. 
Functional explanations involving neurological correlations often give rise to objections regarding certain 
gaps in our understanding. However, this should not be taken to mean that any such explanation is 
lacking. All scientific explanations contain a similar gap, yet, most of the things they attempt to explain are 
considered complete. 
 
To make things clearer, let’s take an example of a scientific explanation that is uncontroversial, such as 
fire. How is it that rubbing two sticks together gives rise to fire? The answer is well known, friction causes 
a reactant to heat up and eventually combine with an oxidant releasing more heat and light through an 
exothermic reaction. We can go deeper but the reader should get the point. This, like all scientific 
explanations, is only a description of observations, correlations. They don’t explain anything in the sense 
that they uncover any necessary connections. There’s no reason why oxidizing fuels should necessarily 
create a flame, they just do. Yet, this explanation is considered complete. 
 
 All explanations must end somewhere. We can always ask “Why?” in response to any explanation. If the 
scientific explanation of consciousness should be considered systematically incomplete then it is only 
because all scientific explanations should be considered systematically complete. Either there is no hard 
problem of consciousness or any other scientific explanation, or there is a problem with all scientific 
explanations.  Either way, there is nothing especially difficult about explaining consciousness, which is 
what the hard problem purports to claim. 
